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The Government's Role in the Support of Children 
Allen M. Parkman· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous quality of life measures indicate that modem America has 
not been kind to its children. Crime by and against juveniles is on the as-
cend. 1 Test scores are falling 2 and suicides by teenagers are on the rise. 3 
Children have replaced the elderly as the primary victims of poverty in 
the United States.4 A primary cause of these changes has been changes in 
the structure of the family, especially the increase in single-parent house-
holds.5 One fourth of all children live apart from a parent, and recent esti-
mates indicate that one in every two U.S. children will live apart from 
one of his or her parents some time before reaching adulthood. 
Childhood poverty attracts the most concern. While poverty is a 
problem for children in two-parent households, it is a bigger problem in 
single-parent households because absent parents tend to ignore financial 
responsibilities for their children.6 This is because of the fact that less 
than half of custodial parents were due child support payments. 7 In many 
cases, no child support award was made. Even among custodial parents 
with child support awards, only about half received the full amount to 
which they were entitled, one quarter received less than what was owed, 
and one quarter received nothing. 8 More than half of all children poten-
* Allen M. Parkman is a Regents' Professor of Management at Anderson School of 
Management, University of New Mexico in Albuquerque, NM. 
1. John J. Diiulio, Jr., Saving the Children: Crime and Social Policy, in SOCIAL POLICIES 
FOR CHILDREN 202-256 {Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1996). 
2. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES tbl. 271, 
at 175 (1995). 
3. !d., tbl. 136, at 100. 
4. In 1970, 24.6% of people over 65 lived below the poverty level, while 14.9% of 
children under 18 were in that situation. Their positions were reversed by 1993, when only 12.2% 
of people over 65 fell below the poverty level, but the percentage of children had grown to 22%. 
!d. tbl. 745, 748, at 480-81. 
5. SARA MCLANAHAN AND GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT 
HURTS, WHAT HELPS (1994). Over half of children under 18 in families with a single female head 
of household were living below the poverty level. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 2, tbl. 
750, at 483. 
6. While 22% of children live in poverty, over 50% of those in single parent households 
are living in a state of poverty. Supra note 2, tbl. 756, at 483. 
7. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, WHO RECEIVES CHILD SUPPORT?, SB/95-16, at I (1995). 
8. This situation has not changed over the last few decades. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY, 1978, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS ser. P-23, no. 112 (1981). 
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tially eligible for child support receive nothing from their biological fa-
thers.9 Conditions are particularly grave for the children of unmarried 
mothers, because only 30% of these mothers have established paternity 
and have received a child support award. This situation is not expected to 
improve, as one half of the next generation is expected to qualify for 
child support at some time in their lives. As a result, the quality of our 
child support system is important to the well-being of society, and the 
government has a central role in determining that quality. 
We are at a crossroads. The role of the government in the support of 
children is a critical public policy issue. A variety of opinions exist. 
Some argue that the sole responsibility of the government should be to 
make sure that parents and families fulfill their financial obligations to 
their children. 10 This conclusion is often based on ethical considerations. 
Others contend that government programs encourage the wrong people to 
become parents. These individuals argue that parents who cannot afford 
their children should put the children up for adoption rather than grab-
bing for government support. Meanwhile, others advocate a government 
guaranteed minimum level of financial support for all children. 11 These 
people see the plight of children as similar to the past plight of the elderly 
that was in part corrected by Social Security. They see government guar-
anteed child support as an extension of Social Security to the young. 
This article addresses the issue of the government's role in child sup-
port using an economic framework. Voluntary choices both inside and 
outside markets generally tend to increase social welfare. We are all fa-
miliar with market transactions in which both the buyer and seller feel 
that they have gained from the transaction. Similar situations exist out-
side markets. 12 For example, brides and grooms usually exchange their 
vows with the expectation that marriage will increase their welfare rela-
tive to their alternative choice, i.e., remaining single. However, not all 
voluntary choices increase social welfare. These situations reflect "mar-
ket failure," which occurs when transactions have substantial effects on 
third parties, or when either sellers or buyers have market power. A par-
9. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY, 1989 ser. P-60, no. 173 
(1991). 
10. Charles Murray, The Coming White Underclass, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1993, at Al8. 
II. A program that would provide government assured child support is summarized in Irwin 
Garfinkel, et al., Findings of the Wisconsin Child Support Reform Project: Introduction and 
Summary, in CHILD SUPPORT ASSURANCE: DESIGN ISSUES, EXPECTED IMPACTS, AND POLITICAL 
BARRIERS AS SEEN FROM WISCONSIN, (Irwin Garfinkel, et al. eds., 1992). It is fairly common in 
Europe for governments to guarantee a specific level of child support if it is not provided by an 
absent parent. See Alfred J. Kahn & Sheila B. Kamerrnan, Child Support in the United States: 
The Problem, in CHILD SUPPORT: FROM COLLECTION TO SOCIAL POLICY 10-19 (Alfred J. Kahn & 
Sheila B. Kamerrnan, eds., 1988). 
12. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991). 
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ticular concern addressed in this article is externalities, which is a term 
referring to the positive and negative effects people's choices have on 
third parties. For example, a well manicured lawn can be a source of pos-
itive externalities for neighbors, while an ignored lawn can generate neg-
ative externalities. The government plays an active role in influencing 
externalities. For example, copyright protection for books stimulates pos-
itive externalities, while environmental laws deter negative externalities 
otherwise generated by harmful conduct. 
Children are an externality because they are the result of others' deci-
sions that affect third parties. Voluntary sexual relations are assumed to 
increase the welfare of the participants, regardless of whether or not such 
relations are expected to result in a pregnancy. Sexual relations that result 
in a child cause substantial external effects on third parties. Thus, the 
parents' choice to engage in such relations will have a significant exter-
nal effect on the child, and, depending on the quality of the parent-child 
relationship, other members of society may realize significant effects. 
Positive externalities include an enjoyable life and a child's constmctive 
contributions to society. However, negative externalities may develop if 
the child has difficulty adjusting to life and participates in counterproduc-
tive or criminal acts that result in a destructive impact on social welfare. 
The government can have a central role in determining whether sexual 
relations result in positive rather than negative externalities. 
Child support refers to more than simply financial support. 13 Of cen-
tral importance is the effect of government funding versus parental fund-
ing of children on broader aspects of their lives. 14 Increasingly, the gov-
ernment assumes financial responsibility for some children-a role that 
was traditionally filled by parents and their families. This shift in respon-
sibility affects the incentives for parents to make choices that increase 
their children and society's welfare. With less financial responsibility for 
their children, some parents neglect their other parental responsibilities to 
the detriment of their children and society. 
13. The recognition that support goes beyond just financial support has been a source of 
frustration. While acknowledging that children thrive when they receive emotional and financial 
support from both parents, the U. S. Commission on Interstate Child Support, based on its 
legislative mandate, elected to address only financial support. Margaret Campbell Haynes, 
Supporting Our Children: A Blueprint for Reform, 27 FAM. L.Q. 7, 9 (1993). 
14. This concern can be illustrated by the difference between the quantity and quality of 
adults. In his defense of a larger social role in child support, Harry Krause expresses a concern 
that reproduction rates may fall to levels endangering our economy and the social security system. 
Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public 
Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1, 27 (1990). Ignored is the quality of the adults produced by publicly 
funded child support. 
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Families consisting of adults and their children have traditionally 
played a critical role in society. 15 Parents perform the important function 
of preparing their children for life by educating them and providing them 
with important social values. The role of being a parent extends far be-
yond just the obligation to provide financial support to children. Changes 
in the laws governing the financial responsibilities of the parents and the 
government effect the parents' incentives to assume and perform their 
traditional role. Economic analysis evaluates these incentives and dis-
cusses alternative programs for improving the incentives for parents to 
act in a manner which improves their children's welfare. 
Government child support should focus on children's welfare, recog-
nizing that the central role of adults should be to prepare children for 
adulthood. Current trends indicate that parents are doing a poor job with 
this responsibility, thus increasing the need for the government to reeval-
uate the incentives given to parents. While the quality of life for children 
may be deteriorating in two-parent households, 16 single-parent house-
holds represent a much larger problem. An obvious difficulty for many of 
these single-parent households is a lack of adequate income. Children in 
single-parent households will benefit substantially if the government 
identifies both of the children's parents and forces them to assume re-
sponsibility for their children's support. The parents' obligation to pro-
vide financial support for their children should be predictable. Govern-
ments have a central role in establishing guidelines and assuring that the 
funds are paid, for example, by withholding income when necessary. 
A concern for children's welfare, primarily addressed by increasing 
the money and services available to custodial parents, shifts the public 
policy focus away from the fundamental problem facing children today: 
unprepared and irresponsible parents. Now more than ever, successful 
parenting requires much more than just the desire for or acceptance of a 
child. The next section presents a brief history of the government's role 
in the support of children. Later this article will discuss the incentives 
these programs create for parents and government officials. This article 
concludes by considering alternatives to government financial support 
that have the potential for increasing the welfare of children. 
15. MARK HUHER, THE FAMILY EXPERIENCE 5 (1991). 
16. No-fault divorce has created incentives for parents to focus more closely on their own 
self interest rather than that of their families. See ALLEN M. PARKMAN, No-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT 
WENT WRONG? 99 (1992). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The role of the government in the financial support of children has 
grown dramatically during this century. 17 Parents and their families tradi-
tionally were the primary sources of support for children. However, this 
situation changed early in this century, when states enacted mothers' pen-
sion laws to provide financial support for children. At the time of the 
Great Depression, only two states did not have this type of legislation. 
Some states permitted payments to mothers who were not widows, but, as 
of 1931, more than 80% of those aided were widows. The Federal Gov-
ernment enacted similar legislation as part of the Social Security Act of 
1935. 18 The Aid to Dependent Children program, patterned after the 
mothers' pension programs, expanded coverage to include divorced, sep-
arated and never-married mothers as well as the children of widows. 19 
Coverage under the federal program was expanded to include custo-
dial parents, and, in 1950, the program's name was changed to Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). In the 1960s, the Federal 
Government expanded programs to benefit children to include food 
stamps and Medicaid, while also expanding the benefits from and eligi-
bility for AFDC.20 
Still, these programs were not intended to replace the financial sup-
port of living parents, especially fathers. Concerns about living parents 
not participating in their children's support caused Congress in 197 4 to 
add Title IV -D to the Social Security Act. This legislation established the 
federal child support enforcement system by creating an Office of Child 
Support Enforcement (OCSE) within the U. S. Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (HEW).21 It required all states to establish state 
offices of child support enforcement, and provided federal reimburse-
ment for three-quarters of each state's enforcement costs. The initial re-
sults from this initiative were not encouraging. A 1981 study by the Cen-
sus Bureau revealed that less than one half of the nonresident parents 
paid any child support.22 Only six out of ten mothers had child support 
awards, and only one out of ten never-married women had child support 
17. For a summary of the historical development of welfare programs, see IRWIN GARFINKEL 
& SARA S. MCLANAHAN, STNGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 87-128 (1986). 
18. !d. 
19. While Aid for Dependent Children was intended to meet the needs of a child who had 
lost a parent, it quickly shifted toward being a program for supporting children who faced 
financial difficulties for other reasons. By 1940, only 42% of the participants had lost a parent 
and that percentage fell to less than I% by 1982. Lowell H. Lima & Robert C. Harris, The Child 
Support Enforcement Program in the United States, in CHILD SUPPORT 21 (Alfred J. Kahn & 
Sheila B. Kamerman, eds., 1988). 
20. !d. at 24. 
21. !d. at 33. 
22. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1978, P-23(112) (1981). 
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awards. Among mothers with awards, only about half received the full 
amount to which they were entitled and over one quarter received noth-
mg. 
Recognizing the deficiencies in the existing process, the Federal 
Government enacted additional legislation. The Child Support Enforce-
ment Amendments of 1984 required states to adopt numeric child support 
guidelines that courts could use, at their discretion, to determine child 
support obligations. The Act also bound states to withhold child support 
obligations from wages and other income of nonresident parents who be-
come one month delinquent in their child support payments. 23 States were 
encouraged to develop expedited processes to establish paternity. Ex-
panding upon the 1984 legislation, The Family Support Act of 1988 re-
quired states to establish procedures to determine paternity, to create 
guidelines for setting initial awards, to update awards on a regular basis, 
and to automatically withhold child support obligations from the pay-
checks of nonresident parents. 24 
While most legislation was aimed at increasing the financial support 
from parents, other legislation worked for government guaranteed child 
support. Researchers at the University of Wisconsin developed a proposal 
for a child support assurance system that would add a government guar-
antee of a minimum level of child support to the requirements of the 
1988 legislation. The idea of government-guaranteed child support re-
ceived additional recognition in 1991, when the National Commission on 
Children recommended that the federal government, in partnership with 
several states, undertake a demonstration project to design and test a gov-
ernment insured child support plan. Recently, President Clinton proposed 
the Work and Responsibility Act of 1994, which incorporates a child sup-
port system for the twenty-first century, by including provisions that es-
tablish awards in every case, ensure fair award levels, and collect awards 
that are owed. Two other proposals in the Act guarantee some level of 
child support by testing the concept of child support assurance by en-
hancing parental responsibility and opportunity for nonresident parents to 
contribute to the support to their children. 
The primary role of the government should be to increase social wel-
fare. At first glance, it would appear that the welfare of children living in 
poverty would be best served by transferring income to them if not from 
their non-residential parents, then from the government through their cus-
todial parents. The welfare of children living in poverty would be best 
served by transferring income to the children, either from their non-resi-
dent parents, or from the government through their custodial parents. 
23. Lima & Harris, supra note 19, at 35. 
24. Lima & Harris, supra note 19. 
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However, further reflection indicates that the incentives created by gov-
ernment financial transfers to custodial parents may result in long-term 
negative externalities to children and society. Ideally, children will have 
parents who are capable and committed to preparing them for life. Unfor-
tunately, an increased role for the government in providing financial sup-
port to children has perverse incentives for parents and government offi-
cials that reduce the likelihood that children will grow up in that type of 
environment. 
Ill. INCENTIVES FOR PARENTS 
The government's assumption of the financial role traditionally held 
by parents and families has encouraged some unprepared and irresponsi-
ble people to become parents.25 Often these parents are not willing to ac-
cept the cost of parenthood associated with a long-term commitment to 
their spouses and the sacrifices necessary to prepare their children for 
life. If all children had a right to child support-if not from their parents, 
then from the government-that support system would assume much of 
the role currently held by welfare programs, such as AFDC, and the prob-
lems that are increasingly associated with them.26 Paramount among the 
problems associated with welfare programs are the incentives for unpre-
pared and irresponsible parents to have children and the disincentives for 
parents to establish a two-parent household. Many authors agree that liv-
ing in a two-parent household is more desirable for a child than a single-
parent household. 27 
25. It is noteworthy that when people consider the rationale for parental child support, they 
include situations such as the ongoing family, after divorce, and when the absent parent never 
participated in the family. Ignored is the incentives that a predictable child support obligation 
would have for certain people avoiding becoming parents in the first place. See Krause, supra 
note 14, at 4. Ignoring incentives in the current system that permit men to father children for 
which they are unwilling to assume any responsibility, and for women to mother children often 
to the extreme detriment of the children, Krause notes that many fathers simply do not have 
sufficient income to support their children. It would be unfair to expect such fathers to foot the 
btll for their children; thus, these children have a claim on society, along with their claim on the 
parents. !d. at 14. Others have expressed a deeper concern for the "problems" of the fathers rather 
than the "problems" of the children. Roger J. R. Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads: 1f1e 
Problem with the Direction of Welfare Reform, 15 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & PoL'Y I (1994). 
26. While AFDC payments are often identified as the only source of support for unmarried, 
poor mothers, the package of benefits can be much larger including food stamps, Medicaid, public 
housing, nutrition assistance, and utility assistance. The incentives created by these programs are 
discussed in CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980 (1984). 
27. McLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 5. Not only do single parents do a poor job of 
preparing children for becoming adults, they often are the source of child abuse. Richard J. Gelles 
& Murray A. Straus, Profiling Violent Families, in INTIMATE VIOLENCE: THE DEFINITIVE STUDY 
OF THE CASES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ABUSE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 77-97 (Richard .1. Gelles 
& Murray A. Straus, eds., 1988). Note that the prototypical abusive parent would be a single 
parent under thirty, married for less than ten years, had his or her first child before the age of 
eighteen, and was unemployed or employed part-time. 
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Government support programs that focus on the financial needs of 
children tend to ignore the traditional role of parents. 28 Parenting goes far 
beyond just putting food on the table; parenting also includes nurturing 
children. Parents, further, play an important role in preparing their chil-
dren for life by educating them and teaching them important social val-
ues. While the educational role has been assumed to some extent by the 
government, parents still have an important role in education and the cen-
tral function of establishing critical social values.29 The decline in the 
family is associated with a decrease in the recognition of these critical 
social values by the current generation. 
A. The Costs and Benefits of Parenthood 
While the creation and nurturing roles of parents are instinctive, costs 
and benefits influence the choices made in conjunction with those roles. 30 
While successful parenting is costly, requiring substantial investments of 
time, energy and money, it also offers the potential for being the most 
beneficial and rewarding experience of a person's life. Social welfare is 
increased by activities, such as good parenting, whose benefits exceed 
their costs. Parents who make substantial investments in their children 
increase the likelihood that their children will tum into productive mem-
bers of society, which benefits society and families. Alternatively, when 
people produce children who are disruptive in their youth and antisocial 
as adults, the costs may exceed the benefits. Society would be better off 
if these children had been encouraged to make different choices during 
their lives. 
Traditionally, parents had incentives to avoid raising antisocial and 
disruptive and antisocial children because the best interests of the parents 
coincided with those of society. Most costs and benefits of children were 
internalized in the family because parents could anticipate a lifelong rela-
tionship with their children. This familial relationship was especially true 
in agrarian societies in which geographic mobility was limited. The threat 
28. While proponents of CSAS acknowledge that economic theory suggests that increasing 
the income of families headed by single women will enlarge the women and children living in 
such families, they go on to say that "increasing the incomes of families headed by single women 
will reduce some if not all of their present problems, it might also reduce the negative 
consequences associated with growing up in such a family." GARFINKEL & McLANAHAN, supra 
note 17, at 3. 
29. According to an Oregon longitudinal study, the single best predictor of adolescent 
criminal behavior is a long established pattern of early antisocial behavior in school associated 
with a dysfunctional family situation. Hill Walker & Robert Sylwester, Where is School Along the 
Path to Prison?, EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP, Sept. 1991, at 14-16. 
30. Allen M. Parkman, The Deterioration in the Family: A Law and Economics Perspective, 
in THE INDIVIDUAL, TilE FAMILY AND SOCIAL GOOD: PERSONAL FULFILLMENT IN TIMES OF CHANGE 
21-52 (Gary Melton, ed., 1995). 
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of poor parenting imposing a substantial cost on parents encouraged par-
ents to devote substantial time, money and effort to raising their children. 
In addition, the children were the future source of their parents' support 
in their old age, and poor parenting could eliminate prospective support. 
As a result of these incentives for responsible parenting, families and so-
ciety were better off. 
Responsible parenting also stemmed from viewing parenting as a 
privilege, with significant entry barriers, rather than a right. Men and 
Women were usually expected to marry because premarital sex could 
create substantial problems for society and, therefore, strong sanctions 
were imposed to discourage it. A couple customarily had to wait until 
they had accumulated ample resources to establish their own household 
before they were married. Limited opportunities for divorce encouraged 
adults to devote substantial time and effort to choosing a mate and mak-
ing their marriage a success. The requirement of minimum resources be-
fore marriage and the stability provided by the long duration of the par-
ents' marriage generally worked to the advantage of the couple's chil-
dren. 
This pattern of cohesive, lasting parent-child relationships has 
changed dramatically as some parents now expect a much weaker attach-
ment to their children. In part, this weakening is due to greater geo-
graphic mobility, but it is also due to society accepting responsibilities 
and costs that used to belong to the parents. With fewer responsibilities, 
parents limit their involvement in their children's lives. Before AFDC, 
parents, especially fathers, or their families were expected to support 
their children. If the father was unable or unwilling to assume that role, 
the burden fell on the mother or her family-a role that they often did not 
assume happily-making it difficult for a father to avoid his responsibili-
ties. Today, society assumes responsibility for the financial obligations of 
some fathers, and also assumes a custodial responsibility for children. 
When parents do a poor job raising their child, it is now common for the 
child to be sent to a publicly funded institution. Consequently, between 
1950 and 1990, the number of children in juvenile institutions rose from 
37,000 to 104,000.31 Further, the dramatic increase in the homeless popu-
lation is another reflection of weaker links between parents and their chil-
dren.32 
31. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORJCAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL 
TIMES TO 1970 at 419 (1976) and U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTIC ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1994 at 69 (\994). 
32. Two parent households gave children access not only to their parents, but also to a 
network of aunts, uncles and grandparents. This network is usually smaller and weaker when the 
child grows up in a single-parent household. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, THE HOMELESS 80 (\994). 
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Because of the decline in the parents' presence in their children's 
lives, the benefits and, more importantly, the costs of children have in-
creasingly fallen on external parties. The external benefits consist of so-
cial interactions and increased productivity, while the external costs in-
clude increased taxes for education and correcting or disciplining antiso-
cial behavior such as crime. Many parents associate fewer costs with 
poor parenting, and fewer benefits from expending substantial efforts to 
be good parents. 
The most obvious of these parents are those who do not participate in 
the rearing of their children, especially fathers. Between 1970 and 1994, 
the percentage of American children living in mother-only families 
climbed from 12% to 27%.33 According to the Census Bureau data, 19 
million children were living in families with no father present in 1994.34 
Moreover, fatherless families are often in neighborhoods where more 
than one half of all families with children are headed by a woman with no 
father present. 35 In some situations, the fathers have no contact with their 
children at all. Thirty percent of all children born in 1992 were born to 
unmarried women/6 though in some cases, the children were born to co-
habitating parents. In 1992, there were 354,000 births to unmarried 
women aged fifteen to nineteen compared with 190,000 births to that 
group in 1970.37 If one half of today's children are expected to spend 
some of their childhood in a single-parent home, the ties between the par-
ents and their children later in life may be weaker than in the past. In 
many cases, therefore, parents will assume less of a burden for poor 
parenting than they did in the past. 
As some shift the cost of poor parenting to others, the government's 
role in forcing parents to assume financial responsibility for their chil-
dren is highly laudable and necessary for increasing social welfare. Cur-
rently, some parents, especially fathers, escape or limit their parental 
costs. 38 Yet, social welfare would be enhanced if parents were confronted 
with a substantial share of parental costs, which might encourage them to 
have children only when that choice will benefit the children, their par-
ents and society. Some people, when confronted with these parental 
costs, might decide that they would prefer not to become a parent. They 
can only be confronted with these costs when they know that paternity 
33. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 2, tbl. 71, at 61. 
34. !d., tbl. 78, at 65. 
35. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK 5 (1995). 
36. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 2, tbl. 88, at 73. 
37. /d., tbl. 94, at 77. 
38. At least one author sees a contradiction between increased social acceptance of 
consensual non-marital sex and the strict enforcement of a civil liability on the parents for their 
sometimes accidental children. See KRAUSE, supra note 14, at 20. 
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will be diligently pursued, followed by predictable and enforceable child 
support obligations. Meanwhile, government sponsored child support 
subsidizes parental costs, thus, encouraging the wrong people to become 
parents. 
B. Long-term Commitment 
Single-parent households, a prevalent cause of poverty affecting chil-
dren, result from the lack of long-term commitment between prospective 
parents. The problems facing children are particularly acute when their 
parents have not made a long-term commitment to each other, resulting 
in single-parent households. While this problem is particularly acute if 
the parents never lived together, it is also a problem when cohabitating or 
married couples separate. Two social science commentators, Sara 
McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, stated the following: 
Children who grow up in a household with only one biological parent 
are worse off, on average, than children who grow up in a household 
with both of their biological parents, regardless of the parents' race or 
educational background, regardless of whether the parents are married 
when the child is born, and regardless of whether the resident parent 
remarries. 39 
Evidence indicates that single-parent households detrimentally affect 
school performance. For example, white children raised in a single-parent 
household are about 5% less likely to finish high school, while black 
children are 13% less likely.40 
The mean age at first birth for women receiving AFDC in 1993 was 
20.3 years.41 Teenage pregnancy and motherhood are associated with 
lower educational attainment and higher fertility for the mother and the 
children, both of which limit their opportunities to develop skills and rel-
evant experience, thereby reducing their earning capacities.42 In addition 
to low earning capacities, single parents are less able to instill important 
social values in their children. Almost two-thirds of rapists, three-quar-
ters of adolescent murderers, and the same percentage of long term prison 
inmates are young males who grew up in fatherless homes.43 Children 
living in single-parent families headed by never-married young women 
39. MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 5, at I. 
40. Sara McLanahan, Family Structure and the Reproduction of Poverty, 90 AM. J. Soc. 
873-90 I (1985). 
41. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MOTHERS WHO RECEIVE AFDC PAYMENTS SB/95-2 (1995). 
42. KRISTIN A. MOORE AND MARTHA R. BURT, PRIVATE CRISIS, PUBLIC COSTS: POLICY 
PERSPECTIVES ON TEENAGE CHILDBEARING (1982). 
43. Irving Kristol, Life Without Father, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1994, at A13. 
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have far higher delinquency rates than children who grow up in two-par-
ent families. 44 
C. Parents Below the Poverty Level 
As noted above, children benefit from parents who are committed to 
each other and who are willing and able to incur substantial parenting 
costs, a term which embraces more than just financial expenses. If suc-
cessful parenting requires a substantial commitment, it seems reasonable 
that being financially capable of supporting the child is fundamental. A 
myriad of factors cause poverty, some of which are beyond the individ-
ual's control. Despite the considerable financial burden associated with 
child rearing, many low income people willingly accept the burden for 
the sake of having a family. However, some people parent children that 
they are unable or unwilling to support and that often has to be viewed as 
an irresponsible act.45 This disfavor is due to a lack of money and, fur-
ther, serves as a reflection of a fundamental lack of concern for the 
child's welfare. Interestingly, public funding encourages the irresponsible 
to have children. People who are unwilling or unable to fulfill the finan-
cial obligations associated with parenthood often are less likely to fulfill 
other parental obligations, such as educating and socializing their chil-
dren.46 
Welfare programs have reduced the financial cost of children for 
some parents, thereby, increasing the quantity of children demanded. Sin-
gle mothers have more easily qualified for aid, so economic analysis con-
cludes that the growth in those programs has contributed to the increase 
in the ratio of illegitimate to legitimate birth. 47 For example, the number 
44. JAMES Q. WILSON & JOAN PETERSILIA, CRIME (1995). 
45. The rise in births to unmarried women is increasing at the same time that birthrates 
overall are decreasing. While accidents do occur, this data reflects the ability of adults to exercise 
some control over pregnancies. The birthrate per thousand unmarried women has increased from 
26 in 1970 to 45 in 1992. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 2, tbl. 94, at 77. The 
birthrate per thousand women aged 15-44 has generally fallen during this century from 127 in 
1910 to 69 in 1992. It dropped dramatically during the Great Depression and then recovered 
during the post World War II baby boom. This decline is particularly noticeable since 1960, when 
the birthrate was I I 8 per thousand women aged 15-44. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL 
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES ser. Be-10, at 49 (1976) and U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 
supra note 2, tbl. 89, at 74. 
46. Robert Haveman & Barbara Wolfe, The Determinants of Children's Attainments.· A 
Review of Methods and Findings, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1829-1878 (1995), presents a summary 
of the research on the factors that influence children's attainments later in life. They note that 
growing up in a poor family appears to have a particularly negative effect on later work and 
earnings. !d. at 1864. Recognizing these problems, it has been advocated that the government 
provide support while increasing the high cost and ineffective process of having social workers 
scmtinize the quality of the children's home life. Children could be removed from homes that had 
been bureaucratically determined to be inadequate. Krause, supra note 14, at 29. 
47. BECKER, supra note 12, at 139. 
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of recipients in the AFDC program rose from 9.7 million in 1970 to 13.7 
million in 1992.48 
While the value of AFDC payments adjusted for inflation have de-
clined since 1970, academic literature concludes that AFDC and the other 
welfare programs have created incentives for unmarried women to have 
children. 49 While early research on welfare programs, especially AFDC, 
produced mixed results, current research associates these programs with 
the increase in illegitimacy rates and the poverty of unmarried mothers 
and their children.50 Others have argued that even though inflation ad-
justed AFDC payments fell after 1970, the large increases in those pay-
ments during the 1960s encouraged unmarried women to have children; 
thus, in the 1960s, many of the social restraints on illegitimacy eroded as 
out-of-wedlock births became more common.51 Although early research 
did not establish a statistically significant relationship between AFDC 
payments and the number of unmarried mothers, the logical assertion is 
that unmarried mothers generally could not have established independent 
households without the substantial increase in welfare programs, eligibil-
ity and payments that have occurred since the 1960s. 
Welfare fosters undesirable results. First, it permits women with poor 
employment opportunities to establish an independent household usually 
under poverty conditions. Second, it induces women with employable 
skills to become mothers who often forsake employment and, thereby, 
join the ranks of the poor. 52 Their fall below the poverty level is based on 
the relative attraction of low paying jobs and motherhood. Low paying 
jobs are unattractive, while caring for one's child is far more appealing. 
48. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 2 tbl. 589, at 377. 
49. The welfare programs available to unmarried, poor mothers can include AFDC, food 
stamps, Medicaid, public housing, nutrition assistance, and utility assistance. If someone qualified 
for all of these programs, their value would be equivalent to pretax earnings of $27,760 in Hawaii 
to $13,059 in Mississippi, or if they only qualified for AFDC, food stamps and Medicaid, it 
would be equivalent to pretax earnings of $21,300 in Alaska to $6,100 in Mississippi. Michael 
Tanner, et al., The Work vs. Welfare Tradeoff, PoL'Y ANALYSIS, Sept. 19, 1995, at 240. 
50. Nearly all of the earlier investigations used cross-sectional state or SMSA data. It is 
difficult to establish causation with contemporaneous cross-sectional data and conventional 
regression techniques. To avoid these problems, more recent studies such as Calmon R. 
Winegarden, AFDC and 1/legitimacy Ratios: A Vector-Autoregressive Model, 20 APPLIED 
ECONOMICS 1589-1601 (1988) and Robert D. Plotnick, Welfare and Out-of Wedlock Childbearing: 
Evidence from the 1980s, 52 J. MARRIAGE FAM. 735-746 (1990) have used time series data. Other 
researchers have established a substantial and consistent relationship between the size of public 
assistance payments and illegitimacy by using a more closely focused sample of young women 
in metropolitan areas. See Mark A. Fossett & K. Jill Kiecolt, Mate Availability and Family 
Structure among African Americans in U. S. Metropolitan Areas, 55 J. MARRIAGE FAM. 288-302 
(1993). 
51. Charles Murray, Does Welfare Bring More Babies?, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Spring 1994, 
at 17-30. 
52. Mwangi S. Kimenyi and John Mukum Mbaku, Female Headship, Feminization of 
Poverty and Welfare, 62 S. ECON. J. 44-52 (1995). 
68 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 11 
Though income from welfare may be lower than job wages, motherhood 
may seem more attractive than employment in a low-paying, monotonous 
job; this dichotomy generally results in a household, which would not 
otherwise be classified as poor, joining the ranks of the poor. 
Welfare affects fathers too. To the extent that welfare discourages the 
presence of the father by providing an alternative source of support for a 
mother, it encourages the father to limit his parental responsibilities-a 
choice that some fathers find attractive. Despite the recent surge of 
women in the workforce, men are generally expected to be the primary 
provider. A 1990 poll found that 77% of young women felt a well-paying 
job was an essential requirement for a husband.53 Given society's expec-
tations, it is difficult for a man to participate in a family for which he is 
not the primary source of support. About 24% of the children living with 
a divorced mother and about 33% of the children living with a never-
married or remarried mother had no contact with their fathers during the 
past year. 54 
Parenthood has shifted from being a privilege to a right, with the 
government assuming the financial role traditionally assumed by fathers. 
With AFDC, the government required, and then encouraged, women-
headed households and the absence of the father often to the detriment of 
the children. While much of the thrust of social policy and practice has 
been to dismiss absent fathers, there is a growing body of research em-
phasizing the important role a father's involvement can play in the posi-
tive cognitive, emotional, and social development of his sons and daugh-
ters. 55 Research shows that children born to single teenage mothers are 
more likely to drop out of school, to give birth out of wedlock, to divorce 
or separate, and to be dependent on welfare. 56 A recent report indicates 
that most young men in the juvenile justice system spent at least part of 
their childhood in a single parent household.57 The process has its own 
momentum as the high drop out rate of one generation leads to poor em-
ployment opportunities and absent fathers in the next generation. 58 
Among the poor, government financial support for children expands 
the incentives for people who have not met the most fundamental finan-
cial requirement for parenthood to become parents. If, after government 
financial support, all children had equally qualified and motivated par-
53. Women the Road Ahead, TIME, Fall 1990, at 14. 
54. MCLANANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 5, at 96. 
55. Nicholas Davidson, Life Without Father: America's Greatest Social Catastrophe, 51 
PoL'Y REv. 40-44 (1990). 
56. GARFINKEL & MCLANAHAN, supra note 17, at 1-2. 
57. ANNIE E. CASSEY FOUNDATION, supra note 30, at 13. 
58. Even after income is taken into account, children who grow up in mother-only 
households are still far more likely to become single parents themselves than are people who grow 
up in two-parent households. GARFINKEL & McLANAHAN, supra note 17, at 12. 
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ents, we would have to judge the government support a success. Unfortu-
nately, this does not appear to be the case. Government support appears 
to encourage less qualified and motivated people to become parents. 
D. Parents Above the Poverty Level 
Even among parents above the poverty level, government financial 
support in the form of assured child support can have perverse effects. A 
woman's search for a reliable husband is often masked by romantic no-
tions of marriage. 59 Marriage can sometimes be a precarious institution 
for women, since marrying an irresponsible man can impose substantial 
costs on them during marriage and at divorce, especially if there are chil-
dren. These costs are often financial, but can also result in a reduction in 
their overall quality of life. Parenting can be much more difficult with 
only one parent and, if a divorced woman wants to remarry, custody of 
any children can be a major impediment to an active social life. 
Knowing the costs of a poor choice encourages women to critically 
assess potential mates.60 As marriage has become a more vulnerable insti-
tution, in part because of the enacting of no-fault divorce, adults have 
been delaying marriage. The fault divorce grounds of adultery, cruelty 
and desertion provided some protection for spouses who worked at home. 
That protection was dramatically reduced by the introduction of no-fault 
divorce, which permits unilateral divorce subject to only limited compen-
sation.61 While most women are not familiar with the change in the 
grounds for divorce, they are familiar with the disaster that faces many 
middle-aged mothers who are divorced. As women have approached mar-
riage with more caution, the average age at first marriage for women has 
increased from 20.6 in 1970 to 23.7 in 1988.62 
While potentially costly, children are also a source of great joy. Nor-
mally women are reluctant to marry and mother the children of clearly 
irresponsible men. However, knowing that some government financial 
support is available, some women may screen potential mates less se-
verely and put less effort into making the relationship work. This process 
is analogous to what the insurance industry calls "moral hazard." For ex-
ample, people with insurance are encouraged to increase the activities for 
which the insurance is provided.63 Although the proponents of govern 
59. BECKER, supra note 12, at I 08-134. 
60. It has also encouraged married women to maintain marketable skills during marriage. 
See Allen M. Parkman, Unilateral Divorce and the Labor-Force Participation Rates of Married 
Women, Revisited, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 671-678 (1992). 
61. LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985); and Parkman, supra note 16. 
62. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 2, tbl. 145, at 103. 
63. Peter Kerr, Blatant Fraud Pushing Up the Cost of Car Insurances, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
6, 1992, at A3 (notes auto insurance encourages people to dump their cars into rivers and then 
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ment assured child support have described it as similar to the survivor 
benefits contained in social security, the impact would be very different. 
While "moral hazard" can be a problem with any type of insurance, the 
opportunities for abuse under child support assurance are more numerous 
than under the survivor benefits in Social Security. The later program 
requires the death of the insured worker as a requirement for government 
support, which is an alternative that is clearly not very attractive even 
with the insurance. 
IV. INCENTIVES FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
If government officials had the capacity and motivation to compel 
parents to assume financial responsibility for their children, the incen-
tives for irresponsible parental behavior caused by governmental finan-
cial support for children would be limited. However, it is unlikely that the 
actions of government officials will be effective. Traditionally, child sup-
port enforcement was not a public issue as the dominant social work doc-
trine proclaimed that the father should not be confronted with his support 
obligation because enforcement might inconvenience the mother.64 The 
child support enforcement programs enacted to date have produced poor 
results. A program consisting of paternity identification, child support 
guidelines, and withholding would place a much larger administrative 
burden on governments, especially the Federal Government. A comer-
stone of a government child support program must be the identification 
of non-resident parents followed by the requirement that they contribute 
to their children's support. A review of past performance and future in-
centives suggest that the proponents of a limited role for government 
guaranteed child support have been overly optimistic about the effective-
ness of government officials in this process. 
Although the federal government has been involved in child support 
enforcement since 1975, its record is not impressive. Using 1983 data, 
Garfinkel and McLanahan estimated that only about 40% of absent white 
fathers and 19% of absent black fathers pay child support; among those 
who pay, the average amount received was $3, 129 for white mothers and 
$1 ,698 for black mothers. Placing these figures in perspective, these pay-
ments accounted for about 10% of the income of single white mothers 
and for about 3.5% of the income of black mothers.65 
"Despite a decade and a half of child support reform, by 1990 some 
indicators suggested that there had been little more progress. "66 Of the 
file stolen car claims). 
64. Krause, supra note 14, at 4. 
65. GARFINKEL & MCLANAHAN, supra note 17, at 24. 
66. hwin Garfinkel, et al., Child Support and Child Well-Being: What Have We Learned?, 
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11.5 million custodial parents in 1991, only 54% had obtained child sup-
port awards.67 Custodial mothers received an annual average of $3,011 in 
child support payments, but only 25% of mothers with awards did not 
receive any payments, and another 24% received only partial payments.68 
There are vast differences across the states in the extent to which the 
reforms are being implemented. For example, the paternity establishment 
rate for children born outside of marriage ranges from a low of 5.5% in 
Arizona to a high of 67% in Georgia.69 An analysis of the paternity adju-
dication process in Wisconsin in 1990 demonstrated a range of results 
across counties. 70 Three counties were investigated with substantially 
higher adjudication rates in smaller counties. In the largest county, Mil-
waukee County, only 42% of cases were adjudicated and sanctions were 
rare in part because a staff of 104 was responsible for 77,776 cases. 71 
Even though the federal government has been willing to pay 90% of the 
state's cost to automate their child support record-keeping, most states 
have yet to automate. During the 1980s, the likelihood of a custodial 
mother's obtaining an award and receiving full payment did not change.72 
A recent Urban Institute study showed that potential child support collec-
tions amount to as much as $46 billion in 1995 dollars. 73 Yet only $15 
billion in awards are currently in place and only $10 billion is paid, leav-
ing a collections gap of approximately $36 billion. Overall, average 
awards and payments declined by 25% in real terms between 1978 and 
1985, although some of the change can be explained by a change in the 
composition of the parents. 
As late as December 1994, the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
pointed out that management weaknesses were keeping the Office of 
Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) from effectively leading the program 
and the states, judging how well the program is working, and setting ef-
fective policies. 74 Despite twenty years of required performance report-
ing, OCSE has not developed universally understood data definitions, and 
in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING (Irwin Garfinkel, et al. eds., 1994) 
67. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 2, tbl. 616, at 391. 
68. !d. 
69. MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 5, at 148. 
70. Sara S. McLanahan, et al., Paternity Establishment in AFDC Cases: Three Wisconsin 
Counties, in CHILD SUPPORT ASSURANCE: DESIGN ISSUES, EXPECTED IMPACTS, AND POLITICAL 
BARRIERS AS SEEN FROM WISCONSIN, supra note I I, at 137. 
71. !d. at 146. 
72. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILD SUPPORT ASSURANCE: EFFECT OF APPLYING 
STATE GUIDELINES TO DETERMINE FATHERS' PAYMENTS GAO/HRD-93-26, 2 (1993). 
73. Irwin Garfinkel & Donald T. Oellerich, Noncustodial Fathers' Ability to Pay Child 
Support, in CHILD SUPPORT ASSURANCE: DESIGN ISSUES, EXPECTED IMPACTS, AND POLITICAL 
BARRIERS AS SEEN FROM WISCONSIN, supra note 11, at 73. 
74. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: FAMILIES COULD 
BENEFIT FROM STRONGER ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM GAO/HEHS-95-24, 3 (1994). 
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states collected data in ways that make aggregation and comparison im-
practical. Therefore, OCSE was in no position to know how the national 
program was actually performing. By the early 1990s, OCSE's monitor-
ing role had come into greater prominence with more than half of the 
OCSE staff devoted to compliance audits. State program staffs reported 
to the GAO that the audits helped them gain state legislative support, but 
the audits were too detailed and were too untimely to be useful manage-
ment tools for them, with audit reports sometimes issued two years after 
the period audited. 
A. Who's Fault? 
A common conclusion when a project fails is that it is the fault of the 
underlying legislation rather than the administrator of the program. The 
solution is often new legislation. The incentives facing government offi-
cials who generally find it difficult to make burdensome decisions are 
frequently ignored; forcing parents to confront their financial responsibil-
ities to their children certainly can be burdensome.75 Divorced parents 
usually support two households rather than one, so it is no surprise that 
their finances are strained. Absent fathers are often unemployed. There-
fore, many non-custodial fathers have a legitimate claim to hardship. It is 
easier for officials to ignore the delinquent father and shift support to 
AFDC or any other social program that is available than to force the par-
ents to live up to their obligations. If public programs become more gen-
erous, relative to the resources of the fathers, the choice will become 
even more obvious for officials to provide public funding. This outcome 
is also influenced by the high cost of collecting from delinquent parents. 
In 1994, it cost the Federal government $1.2 billion to collect $7.3 billion 
in child support.76 The child support collected was probably the easiest to 
75. While the record of states' collecting child support is poor, some states are using 
innovative techniques. States such as Nebraska and Iowa have begun building electronic funds 
transfer networks to collect payments. Ellen Messmer, Child Support Law Prompts States to Build 
EFT Networks, NETWORK WoRLD, Feb. 21, 1994, at 14. In Massachusetts, child support collection 
was shifted from the welfare agency to the Department of Revenue (DOR). In two years the state 
has boosted its child support and alimony compliance rate from 59% to 78%. The DOR has a 
better database, but its employees are probably a lot less sympathetic to delinquent fathers. Alan 
R. Earls, Dialing For Deadbeats, COMPUTERWORLD, June 27, 1994, at 129. In contrast to the lack 
of incentives facing government officials, private businesses with a profit motive have a strong 
incentive to co1!ect from "deadbeat" fathers. For example, companies like Child Support Services 
charge an application fee of $35 and a 25% contingency fee based on what they collect. Using 
the classic techniques of the bill-collection trade, Child Support Services locates about 85% of 
its targets. They are particularly effective because the 1977 Fair Debt Collection Practice Act 
restrictions do not apply to court ordered child support obligations. Susan Greco, The Collectors, 
INC., Dec. 1992, at 148-157. 
76. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: OPPORTUNITIES TO 
REDUCE FEDERAL AND STATE COSTS GAO/T-HEHS-95-181, 9-10 (1995). 
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collect, so the return on additional collection efforts would be expected to 
be even less productive. 
The problems associated with government officials identifying and 
collecting from non-resident parents is compounded by the potential lack 
of cooperation from custodial parents who often are looking for a way to 
avoid imposing a cost on the non-custodial parents. If the parents still 
have a relationship, demands for child support tend to strain that relation-
ship and reduce their overall resources.77 Alternatively, the parents may 
not have a harmonious relationship, and the custodial parent may not 
want to be forced to have an ongoing relationship with the non-custodial 
parent or she may fear retaliation if child support is imposed on that par-
ent. Therefore, even if support can be conditioned on cooperation by the 
custodial parent that cooperation may be limited in many cases. Only if 
the custodial parent wants to impose a cost on the non-custodial parent, 
or there is no other source of funds, will the custodial parent have an in-
centive to cooperate with the process. Noting the reluctance of the custo-
dial parent, the bureaucrat will be even more inclined to take the easy 
way out by reporting that a diligent effort has been made to identify and 
collect from the non-custodial parent, thereby, qualifying the family for 
government financial support. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the government's activities to identify both parents and force 
them to provide financial support for their children are laudable and nec-
essary, government financial support can work to the detriment of those 
programs while encouraging additional children by less reliable parents 
and marriages by less responsible adults. Government financial support 
for children has a fundamental appeal by directing money to deserving 
people. It is an easy response, especially if the perverse incentives cre-
ated are ignored. As with welfare programs that encourage unmarried 
mothers to have children, when the perverse incentives created by the 
program are recognized, it is questionable whether the benefits of gov-
ernment child support programs exceed the costs. 
Harder and certainly less appealing programs may ultimately be 
better for society. The preferred government programs to support chil-
dren would work to encourage prepared and responsible couples to have 
children or to place children in homes with those characteristics. Some 
people who have not made a long term commitment to each other and 
have not demonstrated the capacity to make a financial commitment to 
77. Sara S. McLanahan, et al., Child Support Enforcement and Child Well-Being: Greater 
Security or Greater Conflict?, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING, supra note 61, at 239. 
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their children are having children. Their choices can result in negative 
externalities. Current policies condone and to some extent encourage this 
behavior. Shifting from parenthood being a right to the recognition that it 
is a privilege along with society having an obligation to protect children 
would encourage a different program. The cornerstone of any program 
has to be identification of parents coupled with the enforcement of their 
financial obligations to their children. An earned income credit that is 
less dependent on number of children might also be desirable. Still, chil-
dren should not be subjected to unreliable and irresponsible parents. 
Rather than funding irresponsible parents, society should consider plac-
ing these children--for their own benefit-in foster homes or orphan-
ages. When, subsequent to foster placement, at least one parent has dem-
onstrated the requisite parental responsibility, that parent can re-assume 
the parental role and regain custody. For the sake of the children, the pe-
riod in a foster home or orphanage could be limited, permitting adoption 
by people who are willing and able to provide the child with an accept-
able environment. 
Often the argument is made that adequately funded orphanages are 
more expensive than current programs. However, this overlooks the true 
cost of current programs in terms of lower education and employment 
attainment by children, poorer adjustment by them, and, in some cases, 
extreme antisocial behavior. Orphanages, adoption and foster homes are 
clearly a second best solution when compared to a child growing up in a 
loving and competent household. The goal of government financial sup-
port is to promote loving and competent households; however, this article 
argues that government intrusion is more likely to be destructive to these 
environments. 
